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COMMUNICATION AT THE EDGE:
VOLUNTARY SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTING IN THE ANNUAL
REPORT OF A LEGITIMACY THREATENED CORPORATION

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the voluntary social and environmental disclosures made in the annual
reports of Rothmans Ltd between the years of 1955 and 1999. The first part of the paper
focuses on defining legitimacy theory as it has been used in accounting research and
discusses the potential of a resource based approach to testing the theory. The study then
considers legitimacy theory in light of the disclosures made by Rothmans. An initial
qualitative analysis certainly provides examples of expected attempts to legitimatize the
corporation given the threat posed by the smoking and health debate. Initial quantitative
findings contradict those expected when compared to previous studies. However, it is
concluded that when the fairly extreme circumstances faced by the tobacco industry are taken
into account, legitimacy theory does provide a good explanation to both the nature and
amount of the disclosures observed.
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INTRODUCTION
In the effort to understand the motivation of corporations in providing voluntary social
and environmental disclosure a number of theories have been employed. This paper continues
this theme of research through a longitudinal case study conceived as a test of Legitimacy
Theory as it has been described in accounting research. Instead of focusing on a range of
organisations and industries, the examination of a single company compliments previous
broader based studies. This may mean the findings loose some of their ‘generalisability’, but
it also allows for a much richer analysis. Despite the potential for Legitimacy Theory to
explain a broad range of corporate behaviour, there has been relatively little research to date
into Legitimacy Theory except in the context of environmental disclosures.
It has been said that the best way to know someone is to see them under stress; in much
the same way, in science it is often the extreme that help us understand the mundane.
Focusing on the voluntary social disclosures made in the annual reports of a publicly listed
Australian tobacco corporation, an organization that has faced increased government
regulation, heightened community hostility, and threats to its income stream and long term
survival, provides the potential to observe Legitimacy Theory in action under extreme
conditions.
The paper starts with a discussion of the definition of Legitimacy Theory employed.
There follows a brief discussion of the tobacco industry in the context of an increasing threat
to its organisational legitimacy. Longitudinal context analysis techniques and statistical
correlation are then used to examine the nature of disclosures and how they have changed
over time. These changes are interpreted in the context of a Legitimacy Theory grounded
explanation, to establish whether for this organisation the theory can provide a good fit for
the observations.
The paper is not intended to address the ethical or health issues associated with the
tobacco industry. Instead it provides an opportunity to focus on the appropriateness of
Legitimacy Theory for understanding the nature of the annual report, and to further develop
our understanding of accounting as a communicative practice.
This research adds to existing literature in three ways. First, the study looks at a range
of social disclosures, not just the environmental disclosures that have been the traditional
focus of such research, to test for legitimacy motives for disclosure in the annual report.
Second, the explicit focus of this research is a firm at the very ‘edge of societal
legitimacy’. This will provide much richer data than in many previous studies.
Third, the
tobacco industry has been seldom examined by accounting academics (other than a recent
paper by Campbell et al. (2003) discussed later). Further examination of this significant (in
terms of both economic and political power) industry seems warranted.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
AN OVERVIEW OF LEGITIMACY THEORY
“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values,
beliefs, and definitions.” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574, emphasis in original)
One of the problems of legitimacy theory has been that the term has, on occasion, been
used fairly loosely. This should not be seen as a problem of the theory itself and the
observation could be equally applied to a range of theories in a range of disciplines (see for
example Caudill (1997) on the abuse of Evolutionary Theory). A failure to adequately specify
exactly what is being considered has been identified by Suchman (1995, p. 572, emphasis in
original), who observed that “Many researchers employ the term legitimacy, but few define
it”. Hybels (1995, p. 241) comments that “As the tradesmen [sic] of social science have
groped to build elaborate theoretical structures with which to shelter their careers and
disciplines, legitimation has been a blind man’s hammer.” Legitimacy theory does provide the
foundation for this paper, and in an attempt to address some of these concerns of ‘fuzziness’ a
definition of the legitimacy theory being examined will now be provided.
There are in fact a number of layers to the theory which need to be examined. These
are graphically presented in Figure 1 on the following page. The macro theory of
legitimation, known as Institutional Legitimacy Theory, deals with how organisational
structures as a whole (business for example, or the government) have gained acceptance by
society at large. “Within this tradition, legitimacy and institutionalization are virtually
synonymous. Both phenomena empower organizations primarily by making them seem
natural and meaningful” (Suchman, 1995, p. 576, emphasis in original). This conception is
not unproblematic. It takes legitimate institutions to create legitimacy. This creates a ‘chicken
and egg’ paradox, i.e., which came first, the institution or legitimacy. This however is not an
issue this paper can address (this problem is explored by Hybels (1995, esp. p. 241)). In terms
of accounting research given the time frames and questions generally being considered to
take the current business environment, including capitalist structure, type of government, etc.
as a given, a static context within which the research is situated.
Insert Figure 1 about here
One step down from the Institutional Level is what in Figure 1 is called
“Organisational Legitimacy” (sometimes referred to as Strategic Legitimacy Theory or
Instrumental Legitimacy Theory, see Driscoll and Crombie (2001)). “Underlying
organizational legitimacy is a process, legitimation, by which an organization seeks approval
(or avoidance of sanction) from groups in society. Legitimation may be necessary to ensure
an organization's continued existence” (Kaplan and Ruland, 1991, p. 370). It is from this
level that most accounting research tends to draw its understanding of legitimacy (although in
a moment we will see one final layer of resolution that is useful to consider). Mathews (1993,
p. 350) provides a good definition of legitimacy is at this level:
Organisations seek to establish congruence between the social values
associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of
acceptable behaviour in the larger social system in which they are a
part. In so far as these two value systems are congruent we can speak
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of organisational legitimacy. When an actual or potential disparity
exists between the two value systems there will exist a threat to
organisational legitimacy.
At its simplest, within the Organisational view “legitimacy [is] an operational
resource ... that organizations extract - often competitively - from their cultural environments
and that they employ in pursuit of their goals” (Suchman, 1995, p. 575 - 6, emphasis in
original). Legitimacy, just like money, is a resource a business needs to operate. Certain
actions and events increase that legitimacy, and others decrease it. Low legitimacy will have
particularly dire consequences for an organisation, which could ultimately lead to the
forfeiture of the right (or licence) to operate.
This simple view deserves to be further developed. Although we can describe a firm
as being legitimate, and conceive of levels of legitimacy, it becomes a very subjective
exercise to try and directly measure legitimacy. This is because although it has concrete
consequences, legitimacy itself is an abstract concept, given reality by multiple actors in the
social environment. For a researcher to try and directly establish, or even rank, the legitimacy
of various organisations (called ‘Moral Legitimacy’ by Suchman (1995, p. 579)) would seem
to be a necessarily subjective undertaking, preferencing the researcher’s own views. As
Hybels (1995, p. 243) argues, “I reject this view because it is based on a conflation of the
roles of observer and participant in social science”.
As an alternative, rather than trying to subjectively measure a firm’s legitimacy
directly it can instead, arguably more objectively, be inferred from the fact that being
legitimate “enables organizations to attract resources necessary for survival (e.g., scarce
materials, patronage, political approval)” (Hearit, 1995, p. 2). Hybels (1995, p. 243) develops
this in some detail:
Legitimacy often has been conceptualized as simply one of many
resources that organizations must obtain from their environments. But
rather than viewing legitimacy as something that is exchanged among
institutions, legitimacy is better conceived as both part of the context for
exchange and a by-product of exchange. Legitimacy itself has no
material form. It exists only as a symbolic representation of the collective
evaluation of an institution, as evidenced to both observers and
participants perhaps most convincingly by the flow of resources. …
resources must have symbolic import to function as value in social
exchange. But legitimacy is a higher-order representation of that
symbolism – a representation of representations.
Hybels (1995, p. 243) argues that good models in legitimacy theory must examine the
relevant stakeholders, and how “Each influences the flow of resources crucial to the
organizations’ establishment, growth, and survival, either through direct control or by the
communication of good will”. He identifies (p. 244) four critical organisational stakeholders,
each of which control a number of resources. These are summarized in Table 1 below.
Insert Table 1 about here
The last of these has received considerable attention. The power of the media has
been noted by a number of researchers, including Patten (2002, p. 153), who states “that
while increased media attention can certainly lead to the potential for increased pressures
from any of the three sources [dissatisfaction of public; new or proposed political action;
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increased regulatory oversight], increases in pressure can also arise, particularly with respect
to regulatory oversight.”
Companies try to manage their legitimacy because it “helps to ensure the continued
inflow of capital, labour and customers necessary for viability… It also forestalls regulatory
activities by the state that might occur in the absence of legitimacy... and pre-empts product
boycotts or other disruptive actions by external parties... By mitigating these potential
problems, organizational legitimacy provides managers with a degree of autonomy to decide
how and where business will be conducted” (Neu et al., 1998, p. 265). This is significantly
different from the view of Stanton and Stanton (2002, p. 491) who think that legitimacy
theory is “corporations [being] controlled by community concerns and values”.
Thus instead of trying to directly measure legitimacy, it has been argued that it can be
measured in terms of the resources relevant stakeholders provide. A problem with this view
needs to be acknowledged. If it is argued that a decrease in legitimacy will lead to a reduction
in the flow of resources to the company, and at the same time the resources available to the
company are used as a measure of its legitimacy, then this is obviously a circular argument.
•
•
•
•

Hypothesis: Reduction in Legitimacy Reduces Resource Flows to Organisation
Where: Legitimacy is Measured in Terms of Organisational Resource Flow
Therefore: Replace Legitimacy with its Definition
Hypothesis: Reduction in Organisational Resource Flow Reduces Resource Flows to
Organisation

To overcome this problem researchers have tended to implicitly look for
circumstances that (drawing on the definition of legitimacy given by Mathews (1993) cited
earlier) create an obvious disparity between the firm and the expectations of society. An
example is the case of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Patten, 1992). As Deegan et al. (2002, p.
319) have observed “when significant events such as a major environmental disaster occur, or
when there is sustained mass media interest, then it is reasonable to assume that most
managers would perceive that the organisation's ongoing legitimacy is threatened”. This
begins to look a lot like Moral Legitimacy which has already been criticised in this paper, but
what is needed (and perhaps hasn’t been done enough yet) is to examine more of these events
and measure their effects on resources.
As shown in figure 1 there is a final level of resolution within Legitimacy Theory that
is simply a refinement to Strategic Theory. At this level the theory suggests that a firm will
go through various phases with regard to its Legitimacy. There are four generally accepted
phases within the process of Strategic legitimation.
Establishing Legitimacy This first phase represents the early stages of a firm’s development
and tends to revolve around issues of competence.
Competence concerns organizational effectiveness - the ability of a
corporation to 'deliver the goods'. A corporation must produce a
product or deliver a service that meets with some success in the
marketplace; one that does not break even, and hence fails to meet its
obligations, understandably loses legitimacy with suppliers, bankers,
and customers. Financial viability, however, is not the sole arbiter of
competence; more critically, a corporation must meet socially
constructed standards of quality and desirability as well as perform in
accordance with accepted standards of professionalism (Hearit, 1995,
p. 2).
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Maintaining Legitimacy “Attempts to maintain legitimacy occur when the organization has
attained a threshold of endorsement sufficient for ongoing activity. M aintenance activities
include: (1) ongoing role performance and symbolic assurances that all is well, and (2)
attempts to anticipate and prevent or forestall potential challenges to legitimacy.” (Ashford
and Gibbs, 1990, p. 183)
However the maintenance of legitimacy is not as easy as it may at first appear.
Legitimacy is a dynamic construct.
Community expectations are not considered static, but rather, change
across time thereby requiring organisations to be responsive to the
environment in which they op erate. An organisation could, accepting this
view, lose its legitimacy even if it has not changed its activities from
activities which were previously deemed acceptable (legitimate). Because
community expectations will change across time it is argued that the
organisation must also make disclosures to show that it is also changing
(or perhaps to justify why it is not changing). Changing activities without
communicating such changes is considered to be insufficient (Deegan et
al., 2002, p. 319 - 20).
Extending Legitimacy. “Attempts to extend legitimacy occur when the organization is
becoming established or is entering a new domain of activity or utilizing new structures or
processes. Legitimation activities are apt to be intense and proactive as management attempts
to win the confidence and support of wary potential constituents” (Ashford and Gibbs, 1990,
p. 180).
Defending Legitimacy. “Attempts to defend occur when the organization's extant legitimacy
is threatened or challenged. Legitimation activities tend to be intense and reactive as
management attempts to counter the threat” (Ashford and Gibbs, 1990, p. 183).
It is this last phase that has tended to be the main focus of accounting researchers and,
as mentioned earlier, provides us with an opportunity to examine the crucial link between
legitimacy and resources. Even barring a major incident it is likely in the Western Capitalist
system that almost every corporation will regularly need to defend its legitimacy, by the mere
fact that “corporations must fulfil both a competence and community requirement to realize
legitimacy… Satisfaction of stockholder interests often occurs at the expense of community
concerns (e.g., the despoiling of the environment, the use of labour) while, conversely,
responsibility to the larger community often occurs at the expense of the stockholder”
(Hearit, 1995, p. 3).
Social and Environmental Accounting Theory papers focusing (either explicitly or
implicitly) on the defence of strategic legitimacy have tended to draw on Lindblom (1994)
who identifies four strategies that a company can use to defend its legitimacy:
1.
Change itself - The organisation seeks to inform and educate the ‘relevant
publics’ about actual changes within the organisation.
2.
Change the Public - The organisation seeks to change the perceptions of the
relevant publics, but does not see a need to change its own behaviour.
3.
Manipulation - The organisation seeks to deflect attention from issues of
concern to other issues. For instance, highlighting links with charity.
4.
Misrepresentation - The organisation may go as far as not being totally truthful
about its activities that are of concern to the ‘relevant publics’.
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These last two strategies, which appear to have been particularly relevant to the tobacco
industry, are discussed generally in more detail by Ashford and Gibbs (1990, especially p.
180). Also Harte and Owen (1991, p. 59) note “The need for such an enhancement of
credibility is suggested by earlier research indicating that social information provided within
annual reports tends not to be directly related to quality of actual performance and can indeed
by positively misleading”.
Some interesting additional observations can be noted particularly in light of their
potential relevance to the tobacco industry. Abrahamson and Park (1994, p. 1302) have
identified that in terms of the ‘negative event’ which has led to the threatened legitimacy, at
least one (if not both) of the following communication strategies can be expected from
management: “First, officers interpret the negative outcomes that they do reveal to
shareholders in ways that shift the blame for those outcomes away from themselves”, and
“Second, officers may conceal negative outcomes entirely.”
Hearit (1995, p.6) observes that “re-ligitmation… typically require[s] a dual strategy
of a positive and a negative rhetoric. Corporations seek to distance themselves from their
illegitimate behaviours and then create identifications with the public values they are reputed
to have violated”. The paper goes on “One way to deny wrongdoing is through the use of an
opinion/knowledge dissociation, which challenges the validity of the charges by redefining
them as groundless. Here a company asserts that critics' claims are mere opinions and do not
represent fact” (Hearit, 1995, p. 7). He goes on to say that this can be much more effective
than a mere denial. Both concealment of negative outcomes and knowledge dissociations
have been regular techniques employed by the tobacco industry in dealing with the smoking
and health issue (for a very detailed analysis see Pringle (1998)).
LEGITIMACY, ACCOUNTING AND THE ANNUAL REPORT
The link between Accounting Research and Legitimacy Theory revolves around the
annual report and related disclosures. Gray et al. (1995) discuss the use of this focus on the
annual report in some detail and conclude that the focus is justifiable. Their argument is that
the annual report is not only a statutory document but is in fact “the most important document
in terms of the organization's construction of its own social imagery” (p. 82). The annual
report “uses the tools of management, marketing and communication theory to construct a
picture of the organisation” (Stanton and Stanton, 2002, p. 478). This ‘picture’ is viewed by a
wide audience and “provide[s] organizations with an effective method of managing external
impressions. Annual reports are a primary information source for investors, creditors,
employees, environmental groups and the government” (Neu et al., 1998, p. 269). This view
is also supported by Mangos and Lewis (1995, p. 56) who state that “corporate social
responsiveness as demonstrated within the content of corporate annual reports is both a
visible and measurable social influence”. They also argue, in terms that could be seen as
supportive (or at least suggestive) of Legitimacy Theory, that:
corporate social responsibility is a form of corporate social
responsiveness by the managers of a firm to pressures which they
perceive and the managers then attempt to influence the social
environment. Managers' accounting choice and literate response in
annual report form part of the corporate social responsiveness within
the economic activity (Mangos and Lewis, 1995, p. 54)
It must be acknowledged, however, that this focus is not universally accepted. Zeghal
and Ahmed (1990, p. 51) have criticised the narrow approach taken by many researchers as
their “research indicates that the description provided by the annual reports of social
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information disclosure by a company may not be complete”. They claim that companies use
many different media to make disclosures, and the selection of media and message are very
targeted. By only focussing on one document source researchers may be drawing incomplete
conclusions. Zeghal and Ahmed (1990, p. 39) state that “one cannot judge corporate
performance on social responsibility solely on the basis of information disclosed in the
annual reports. Social information disclosure may also take place through company staff
newspapers, press releases, paid newspaper, television and radio advertising and company
brochures”. Robertson and Nicholson (1996, p. 1099) also express concern about the focus on
the annual report, their concern being that “Cynics of corporate intentions may consider all
corporate social responsibility disclosure as 'lip service' or 'window dressing'. Cynicism
seems justified when descriptions of corporate social responsibility across a range of annual
reports from different companies read as though they were written by the same person, and
are so general as to be meaningless.”
In terms of Legitimacy Theory, however, the researcher is not assuming any link
between the annual report disclosure and actual performance. The annual report is a
document where the organisation communicates the information it wishes to have publicly
available. “In legitimising its actions via disclosure, the corporation hopes ultimately to
justify its continued existence” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 344). Also, the author
acknowledges that examining a range of corporate communications from a legitimacy
perspective would be useful, however this paper is intentionally limited in scope.
SOME SPECIFIC STUDIES OF LEGITIMACY THEORY AND CSD
Only a few researchers have specifically undertaken detailed studies examining
evidence of the operation of legitimacy theory in the annual reports of companies. Fewer still
have used specific measures of resource flows to establish quantifiable measures of
legitimacy. The conclusions have been generally (but not always, see below) affirming. One
recent study was Neu et al. (1998) who examined the disclosures of Canadian mining
companies and concluded that “Although organizations utilize a variety of textually-mediated
communication media such as brochures and advertising in an attempt to, inter alia, sustain
legitimacy, the annual report appears to be the preferred method for communicating with the
… relevant publics as opposed to the general public” (p. 269). Buhr (1998) examined a 28
year history of the Falconbridge foundry in Canada and its struggles in managing Sulphur
Dioxide emissions. She concluded that “an evolution in disclosure [in the annual report]
supports legitimacy theory” (Buhr, 1998, p. 186).
In an Australian study (Deegan et al., 2000) five major incidents (including the Exxon
Valdez oil spill and the Bhopal Disaster) provided a context in which to examine the annual
reports of related (in industrial terms) Australian firms to see if there had been a significant
change in their social or environmental reporting. They concluded:
The results of this study are consistent with legitimacy theory and show
that companies do appear to change their disclosure policies around the
time of major company and industry related social events. … These
results highlight the strategic nature of voluntary social disclosures and
are consistent with a view that management considers that annual report
social disclosures are a useful device to reduce the effects upon a
corporation of events that are perceived to be unfavourable to a
corporation's image (Deegan et al., 2000, p. 127).
Two studies have been undertaken into BHP’s annual report disclosures. The first is
one of the earliest studies into the connection been legitimacy theory and the annual report.
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Guthrie and Parker (1989) examined the correlation between specific types of annual report
disclosures and a detailed history of significant events at BHP. They concluded that “The
evidence examined in this historical case study has failed to confirm legitimacy theory as an
explanation of BHP's CSR over time. In general, little correspondence was found between
peaks of BHP's CSR disclosures and key socio-economic events affecting BHP during its
operating history” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 350).
This became the trigger for Deegan et al. (2002), which given the success of other
papers in finding support for legitimacy theory considered “whether there [was] something
different about BHP, or whether Guthrie and Parker's measure for community concern was
mis-specified” (p. 313). They argued that the original Guthrie and Parker paper (1989), by
focusing on historical events without contextualisation of community awareness had not
provided a good measure.
To establish community awareness Deegan et al. (2002) employed media agenda
setting theory, which emphasizes the importance of the media in informing the public about
specific issues. This is closely aligned with the importance of the media in the strategic
conception of legitimacy theory discussed earlier. A study by Ader (1995), which specifically
examined salience about environmental issues, but which has wider ramifications, concluded
that “The public needs the media to tell them how important an issue the environment is.
Individuals do not learn this from real-world cues” (p. 310). It is also interesting to note that
this paper concluded there was not a strong link between actual environmental performance
and media interest. Although this paper did not look at how firms reacted to the increased
media attention, a number of papers have found a significant and positive relationship
between media disclosure (both negative and positive) and both social and environmental
reporting. See for example Cormier and Gordon’s (2001) study of Canadian utilities type
companies.
An earlier paper by Deegan et al. (2000, p. 105) had discussed the linkages between
Media Agenda Setting Theory and Legitimacy Theory:
How corporations maintain their legitimacy, perhaps through corporate social
disclosure, is influenced by management perceptions of the threats to its
legitimacy. The source of these threats to legitimacy can often come from the
media … Evidence indicates that management react to adverse media coverage,
and use corporate disclosures as a strategy to alleviate the potentially adverse
effects caused by negative media coverage.
Based on an examination of BHP’s Social and Environmental Disclosure and
comparison with newspaper reports Deegan et al. (2002) concluded that their results showed
that higher levels of the print media coverage were associated with higher levels of specific
social and environmental disclosures (and vice versa) made by BHP in its annual reports and
that management did indeed release positive information in reaction to unfavourable media
attention. They conlcuded with the observation that “These results, then, lend support to
legitimation motives for a company's social disclosure” (Deegan et al., 2002, p. 333). It is
this last study, linking media disclosure with Social and Environmental Disclosure in the
annual report which provided the initial inspiration for the current study.
Special mention deserves to be made of Campbell et al. (2003), which in many ways
presents an antithesis to this paper. A longitudinal study (20 years) of three sectors (including
Tobacco) is presented, and whilst similar disclosure patterns to those found in this study for
the Tobacco Industry are observed in the English context almost opposite conclusions are
reached. “L[egitimacy] T[heory] is difficult to defend as a possible explanation of social
disclosure” (Campbell et al., 2003, p. 574). However the conceptualization of Legitimacy
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Theory is based on a normative gauge of legitimacy as opposed to a more objective measure
as per the work of Hybels (1995) already discussed. This would deal with the concerns of
“perceptions” raised by Campbell et al. (2003, p. 562). In addition as shown later in the paper
the fall in disclosure by the tobacco industry, seen as so damning of Legitimacy Theory is no
real surprise and is in fact expected.
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY AND LEGITIMACY
There can be little doubt that the Tobacco Industry has faced a consistent threat to its
legitimacy worldwide since the original negative link was established between smoking and
health. The two watershed documents were the 1962 British Royal College of Physicians
report and the 1964 Surgeon-Generals Report (USA), which both concluded that cigarette
smoking was directly related to Lung Cancer and a number of other diseases. Both received
wide ranging publicity, and both had an immediate impact on cigarette sales (Taylor, 1984,
see esp. pp. 9 - 11). This was the starting point for an increasing range of legislative measures
aimed at regulating tobacco use around the world. In the American context Miles (1982, p.
xiii) observes that:
The smoking-and-health controversy posed one of the most
significant threats in the U.S. business history to the well being of an
established industry. It exposed members of the domestic tobacco
industry not only to an unprecedented wave of unwanted scrutiny
and publicity, but to a long and cumulative series of government
regulations restricting their ability to do business. It hurt their
pocketbooks. It took away their access to the public broadcast
media. It put warning labels on their products. It forced them into
unfamiliar domains. And it threatened the careers of their senior
managers. Just as important, it tarnished their image and wounded
their pride.
He goes on to add that “In short, the smoking-and-health controversy amounted to a
legitimacy crisis of fundamental proportions for the tobacco Big Six” (Miles, 1982, p. xiii,
emphasis added). This view is echoed by Davidson (1991, p. 49) who states that “Perhaps no
industry has been subjected to such serious erosion of its legitimacy as the tobacco industry”.
Both Miles (1982) and Davidson (1991) also discuss in a management context the processes
by which tobacco companies attempted to meet this threat, within the broad framework of
legitimacy, though no mention is specifically made of the annual reports of the companies.
“With the release of the [Royal College of Physicians’ and Surgeon-General’s]
reports on smoking and health, Australian medical and health organisations immediately
called for government action” (Quit, 1995, introduction). Australia appeared to follow a very
similar path to the rest of the Western world in terms of the legitimacy crises for tobacco
companies.
It is not the intention of this paper to provide any sort of extremely detailed historical
overview of the tobacco industry in Australia, only to identify some key events that would
appear to be threatened the legitimacy of the organisation. However some background
information about the company examined in this paper is useful to consider.
Rothmans Holding Limited (also known as Rothmans of Pall Mall), hereafter referred
to as Rothmans, was incorporated in Australia in 1955. It was one of a tripartite of firms that
dominated the Australian tobacco market (the other firms being W.D. and H.O. Wills, and
Phillip Morris) each with about one third of the market. Its Winfield brand came to be the
clear leader in the cigarette market during the 1980s and 90s (Quit, 1995, The Tobacco

10

Industry in Australia). In 1999 Rothmans announced a merger with W.D. and H.O. Wills,
which ultimately led to the delisting of Rothmans as a company and the emergence of British
American Tobacco – Australasia in 2000. This study only considers the period 1955 – 1999,
the Rothmans’ years.
METHOD
Rather than engage in the further development of entirely abstract
constructions of the legitimation process, I have advocated focusing
on linkages to the concrete details of specific organizational situations.
To this end, I have suggested that, to obtain images of legitimation
processes, researchers should investigate the flow of resources from
organizational constituencies as well as the pattern and content of
communications (Hybels, 1995, p. 244)
The remainder of this paper examines the possibility that Rothmans undertook
legitimating activities in light of the threat presented by the smoking and health debate. After
an initial qualitative examination of disclosures in the annual report, examined in the context
of relevant events, a more detailed quantitative analysis is undertaken in the vein suggested
by Hybels (1995) above. An examination of Rothmans’ annual reports provides details of
‘the pattern and content of communications’, while an analysis of media attention (and later
government regulation and taxation) is used to ‘investigate the flow of resources from
organizational constituencies’.
ANNUAL REPORT ANALYSIS
The Australian annual reports of Rothmans Ltd (also known as Rothmans of Pall
Mall) were gathered for the entire time that the company was listed in Australia (1955 –
1999). They were then read to identify at the sentence level instances of voluntary social or
environmental disclosures using an open coding scheme. These disclosures were then subclassified by nature, as presented in the annual report. Only four categories appeared to be
present over the entire 44 years (Employees, Community, Health, and Philanthropy). The
distribution of Disclosure (number of sentences) is shown in Graph 1 on the following page.
The nature of these disclosures will be discussed in more detail in the first part of the results
section that follows. Not e the spike in disclosure in 1980 can be explained by the fact that this
was a special 25th anniversary annual report which was much larger than usual.
Insert Graph 1 about here
MEDIA DISCLOSURE
Determination of the number of articles that were being published on
Tobacco/Cigarettes in any given year would appear to be an extremely difficult endeavor.
Fortunately the APIAS (Australian Public Affairs Information Service) data base provides an
opportunity to overcome this problem. It started (fortuitously given the incorporation date of
Rothmans in Australia) in 1955, with the aim of being “a guide to current material on
Australian political, economic and social affairs” (preface to the first APAIS volume). The
database indexes ‘significant articles’ on a huge variety of subjects (including Tobacco and
Cigarettes) from a range of printed Australian sources, including but not limited to
government publications, newspapers, and magazines. Although representing only a sample
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of Australian sources the database is taken as fairly indicative of the level of media attention
given to a specific subject in a given year.
Each year the database was examined using the keywords “Tobacco”, “Rothmans”,
“Cigarettes” and “Smoking”. The relevant articles listed were classified as being Industry,
Health, or Anti-Smoking Related based on their title and abstract. Please see Graph 2 on the
following page. It should be noted that the range of sources sampled each year changed, so all
statistical calculations are based on this information after it has been converted to a
percentage of all articles, as opposed to being used in their absolute form.
Insert Graph 2 about here
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The question of statistical analysis deserves more attention than it perhaps has
received in previous papers. Unfortunately there is not space in this paper for a full discussion
of the appropriate statistical techniques to use in Corporate Social Disclosure research. This
study is undertaken using exclusively non-parametric statistics. This frees the research from
the underlying assumptions associated with parametric statistics, such as the data being
normally distributed. Though it may appear that the use of non-parametric statistics is less
sensitive to the subtleties data, the reality is the measures of variables employed in Corporate
Social Disclosure research are often based on proxies, and are at such a coarse level
themselves that the use of parametric statistics delivers a result that only has a veneer of
precision. This paper employs Spearman’s Rho (Siegal and Castellan, 1988, p. 235) to
identify correlating factors.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
QUALITATIVE DISCUSSION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT DISCLOSURES
Before undertaking the quantitative analysis of the annual report disclosures it is
worth reviewing briefly the relevant content of the reports. This analysis is in no way
intended to be comprehensive but rather to highlight interesting developments in light of
legitimacy theory.
Disclosures relating to employees first appeared in 1958 as a separate section and
followed a fairly standard pattern most years, generally thanking staff for their commitment,
identifying that the company led the way in training, pay and conditions, and often citing
good relations between the company and the unions. See Figure 2 on the following page.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The 1963 social disclosure of a much more general nature (than just employees)
appears. Interestingly this is the same financial year as the first major adverse report on
smoking and health. A new section was added at the end of the annual report entitled
“Helping Australia’s Progress” (pp. 20-22), within this a page was dedicated to “The
Company as a Citizen” (p. 22). See Figure 3 over page. It states that “Participation in many
fields of national and civic interest continues to be a feature of activities”, and then goes on to
outline the Rothmans University Endowment Fund, and other educational programs with
which it was involved. There is also discussion of the company’s sponsoring of the 1962
Commonwealth Games in Perth and other support given to a range of amateur sporting
associations. 1964 sees a similar section (p. 18), focusing in that year on the setting up of the
Rothmans’ National Sport Foundation.
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Insert Figure 3 about here
Much more interestingly, in 1964 for the first and last time there is an actual section
of the Director’s Report headed “Smoking and Health” (pp. 4-5). In part it says
This is a highly scientific question and, therefore, a difficult one for
the public to understand fully. The great mass of publicity has been
directed against cigarette smoking, but very little publicity has been
accorded to statements by many other eminent scientists and doctors
who do not accept the American and British reports as conclusive…
[Such dissention] is an indication of the extreme uncertainty which
surrounds the accusations
This would appear to be a classic attempt at knowledge dissociation as discussed
earlier in the paper.
From 1966 to 1971 the disclosures remain fairly consistent, focusing on the various
specific company activities associated with sports, fine arts, education, etc. Then in 1972 (the
year compulsory health warnings were introduced) there is no mention of social activities.
From 1973 onwards the focus shifts to the three Rothmans’ foundations (The Rothmans
National Sport Foundation, The Rothmans University Endowment Fund and The Peter
Stuyvesant Trust for the Development of the Arts). One significant difference is the 1980
annual report, which was presented more as a history of Rothmans’ 25 years in Australia. It
contained a substantial section on community service (pp. 14-15). In 1995 the last social
disclosure is made, it refers to the work undertaken by the Rothmans Foundation in Australia,
and states that the decision to close the foundation “was made in light of the adverse impact
of anti-tobacco legislation which had severely hindered the Foundation in its work”. No
more disclosures of a social kind were made in the annual reports of Rothmans.
The tobacco industry in general, and Rothmans specifically, had one major threat to
its legitimacy, the smoking and health issue. Except in 1964 it choose not to engage with this
issue, instead focusing on community service and charitable works. This could appear to be
an attempt to engage in Lindblom’s (1994) third strategy, trying to get the community to
accept the company’s legitimacy, not in terms of the health issue, but by focusing debate to
the organization’s engagement in good works, therefore trying to bolster its position as a
legitimate organization without having to engage in change. Ultimately this would appear to
have failed, at least to the extent that the industry is now highly regulated, scrutinized and
taxed, although it continues to survive. When there no longer seemed to be value in even
trying to defend legitimacy the company ultimately gave up its charitable community
involvement and reporting on it. This issue is now explored in more detail through
quantitative means.
DISCLOSURE AND MEDIA ATTENTION
An initial analysis shows that the variable of interest (Disclosure) is not correlated
with profit (a factor often examined in accounting literature as possibly being associated with
Social and Environmental Disclosure (Cowen et al., 1987; Hackston and Milne, 1996;
Owusu-Ansah, 1998) however against expectations it is negatively correlated the number of
articles (as a percentage of all articles published that year) at a p<0.01 (see Table 2 on the
following page).
Insert Table 2 about here
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This is not easily exp lained and certainly provides prima facie evidence to reject
Deegan’s assertions regarding legitimacy and media theory in this industry. It is interesting to
note the significant positive correlation between the company’s profit (adjusted by CPI to
create a ‘real’ profit figure) and the number of articles written about the company. As an
aside this certainly would seem to support an underlying assumption of agency theory, that
the ‘larger’ a company becomes, the more politically visible it is (see Watts and Zimmerman
(1990)). Introducing lags disrupts any correlation between the variables, indicating that the
company is highly reactive to events occurring at the time.
Given that the threat to legitimacy came directly from the smoking and health debate
which started in 1962 (affecting the annual report from 1963 onwards) and, as discussed
earlier, the company’s response appears to have revolved around increased disclosure of a
social nature, particularly in regards to philanthropy and corporate citizenship, a more
specific set of correlations may be worth considering. The correlation between Social
Disclosure (excluding that disclosure that are employee related) and articles relating to
Tobacco and Health for the period after 1962 are provided in Table 3 below:
Insert Table 3 about Here
Again social disclosure can be seen to be significantly correlated with the number of
articles relating to health at less than the p=0.01 level. The concern remains that they are
negatively correlated. This negative relationship between articles and disclosure contradicts
expectations based on previous findings raising the question of whether Rothmans is
significantly different from the average firm? Brown and Deegan (1998) suggest that
Legitimacy Theory may not be appropriate where “there is a possibility that dominant players
in some industries had strategically planned the timing and format of their environmental
disclosures in a bid to manipulate or shape community perceptions and concerns... rather than
simply reacting to changes in community concerns… Hence, assuming that a relationship
between media attention and annual report environmental disclosures holds across all
industries may be a simplistic assumption” (p. 33). Although this situation would seem to
fairly describe Rothmans’ situation, before accepting this conclusion it is worth considering
whether there is an alternative factor operating that is overriding the normally expected
relationship.
DISCLOSURE AND GOVERNMENT SANCTION
Graph 3 below presents visually the relationship between disclosure, health articles
and introduces a third factor ‘government regulation’ (see Appendix One, for a timetable for
the introduction of each major commonwealth regulation of smoking). This clearly shows the
generally downward trend in social disclosure (trend line indicated by dashed-line) and
suggests a relationship with government regulation (vertical black lines).
Insert Graph 3 about here
When correlations are run using a dummy variable which increases by one each time
a new major regulation is introduced there does appear to be a correlation, again negative (see
Table 4 on the following page), and this correlation would appear to be stronger than the
correlation with media disclosure. This is interesting, and it would be useful at this point to
remember that in the earlier discussion of strategic legitimacy theory, the media was one of a
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number of important stakeholder groups. The government was also mentioned as being an
important group, along with the general public and the financial sector. Perhaps in this case
the government is playing a much stronger influencing role.
Insert Table 4 about here
Regulation is just one of the resources related to government. Another important
consideration is taxation. An analysis taking into account change in excise (as a dummy
variable, increasing by 1 for each rise in excise), shows a very strong correlation with social
disclosure, and again the correlation is negative (see Table 5).
Insert Table 5 about here
The negative correlation between Disclosure and the independent variable (in this
case Government Excise) still exists however. This may not be the surprise it first appears.
Consider that instead of a company defending its legitimacy (the third phase identified as part
of Strategic Legitimacy Theory earlier in the paper), there is actually a fourth phase to
consider, that of an organisation losing legitimacy over a period of time. This view (given
previous discussion on the Tobacco Industry) would seem to be an accurate description of the
situation faced by the Tobacco Industry at large, and Rothmans particularly. This fits
interestingly with some ideas expressed by O’Donovan (2002, p. 350) who argues that:
A potential problem arises if one is to test which tactics are used to maintain
legitimacy. A distinction needs to be made between corporations with
different levels of legitimacy to maintain. If a corporation is accepted as a
good corporate citizen, acts responsibly or even in a proactive manner in
regard to social issues, the public will have certain expectations in relation to
the organization’s social and environmental activities. The less “legitimacy”
an existing organization has to begin with, the less it needs to maintain.
Based on experimental evidence, elicited through a series of vignettes, O’Donovan
(2002) found that the lower the perceived legitimacy of the organisation, the less likely it was
to bother providing social and environmental disclosure. “One would expect a corporation
with the characteristics betrayed in this vignette [low legitimacy, e.g. weapons manufacturer]
not to be too concerned about legitimacy motives in annual report disclosures… A recurring
theme in arguments supporting no disclosure was that the corporation was complying with all
of the current laws and regulations, therefore it did not need to do any more than that to
maintain whatever “poor” reputation it already had.” (O'Donovan, 2002, p. 361).
It would appear that this paper, by examining the tobacco industry, has found
empirical evidence of these different disclosure strategies within a single industry which
moved from relatively high legitimacy to relatively low legitimacy. This provides a potential
explanation for the negative relationship between voluntary Corporate Social Disclosure and
various measures of stakeholder resources (reflecting decreasing legitimacy), abutting well
with legitimacy theory as characterized earlier in the paper.
FURTHER RESEARCH
The relationship between the resources provided by the range of stakeholders
identified and falling legitimacy and falling disclosure levels would be interesting to explore.
Other potential explanatory variables might have included cigarette consumption figures,
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employee salaries or share values. In relation to consumption figures, it would need to be
considered whether the fact that cigarettes, containing at least one drug (nicotine) which is
addictive (this statement would have been controversial in the past, but the evidence now
seems irrefutable (see for example, Henningf ield (1985)), would then preclude them as a
good measure of legitimacy. Presumably the consumer would not be as reactive to legitimacy
issues, since even if they wished to stop smoking tobacco it may be difficult. It is generally
believed that cigarette companies have paid higher wages to its employees. This could be
viewed as a premium that has to be paid to attract employees, particularly as the legitimacy of
the industry falls relative to other industries. The impounding of legitimacy concerns into
share price would also be an extremely interesting, if not technically difficult, study.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the social disclosures made by Rothmans, in the context of
the tobacco industry, over almost 50 years. Its findings, both qualitative and quantitative, are
significant in that they add weight to the argument that there is a legitimacy motivation, at
least in part, underlying the voluntary social disclosures made by firms. The qualitative
analysis strongly suggests that the voluntary social disclosures made in the annual reports of
Rothmans were provided with a view to counteracting the potentially negative consequences
to the firm’s legitimacy of the smoking and health debate.
Though the initial findings of the quantitative analysis were contrary to expectations
based on previous empirical research, additional review in light of further theoretical
development appears to still support a legitimacy explanation for this company, all be it a
state of decreasing legitimacy, which has as yet received little attention in the literature.
Increased focus on a resource based understanding of legitimacy may help develop the theory
further and increase our understanding of firms’ social disclosure.
It is interesting to note at this stage that while the study has been limited to a single
company, social disclosure by the United Kingdom based tobacco company British American
Tobacco (BAT) shown below in Graph 4 shows an extremely similar disclosure pattern as
found in this study. Though not examined in any detail, cursory analysis of the history of the
UK legislative environment for tobacco shows a very similar evolution to that in Australia.
This would seem to provide preliminary evidence that the findings of this study may apply
more broadly, at least in the tobacco industry.
Insert Graph 4 about here

Some interesting research questions are raised by this study which more broadly
based studies could examine. Do the statistically significant correlations between voluntary
social and environmental disclosure and measured resource flows hold across other
industries? Are the relationships for less legitimacy threatened organisations positive? If so at
what point does the relationship change from positive to negative? That is how illegitimate
does a company have to become before its disclosure starts to reduce?
Legitimacy theory offers researchers, and the wider public, a way to critically unpack
corporate disclosures. This knowledge can then be used to provide better and more useful
information to inform decision making by stakeholders. In this way society is empowered to
have greater control and oversight over the way resources are allocated.
Accounting is often characterised as a service function which
proliferates economic information for decision making. However,
there is a danger if we allow the disseminatory role of accounting to
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be too narrowly defined… . In pluralistic societies, accounting's virtue
lies in a capacity to tell multitudinous economic stories about
organisations to the multitudinous audiences interested in the
discourse. … It is everybody else who really needs the kind of
dissemination that accounting could provide (Francis, 1990, p. 11).
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Appendix 1: Highlights of some of the federal legislation with regards to smoking in
past 40 years. Based on ACOSH website http://www.acosh.org/history.htm.
1972 The health warning, “Smoking is a Health Hazard” became compulsory on cigarette
packets in Australia.
1975 Federal legislation banning cigarette advertising on television and radio came into effect
with the Broadcasting television Act Amendment Act 1976, Section 6.
1986 Stronger health warnings were introduced on cigarette packets under the tobacco
(Warning labels) regulations 1987. The Federal government prohibited smoking on all
domestic aircraft flights under the Air Navigational Act 1920.
1987 Four warnings were issued on packets: “Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Smoking
Causes Heart Disease, Smoking Damages Your Lungs, Smoking Reduces Your
Fitness”.
1988 Amendment to the Australian Broadcasting and Television Act, extends bans on direct
advertising to include all tobacco products. The Australian Public Service was
converted to a smoke-free workplace.
1990 Advertising of cigarettes in magazines and newspapers also ceased due to Federal
government legislation under the Smoking & Tobacco Products Advertisements
(Prohibition) Act 1989. Smoking on international airlines within Australia was banned
from 1 September. Cinemas, theatres and concert halls went smoke free under the WA
Health Act 1911 Public Buildings Regulations sections 39 and 58. Smoking was still
permitted in the foyers and bars.
1991 ‘The Morling Judgement’ provides a precedent for courts to deal with claims
concerning passive smoking. Point of Sale Advertising under the Tobacco Control Act
1990 prohibits tobacco advertising outside of shops or in view of public places,
advertising larger than 1m x 1m, larger health warning signs.
1992 The Federal government announced that all tobacco sponsorship of sport and arts end
by 1995/6. Stronger health warnings and content labelling information on cigarette
packages have been announced to come into effect across Australia by 1993.
International airline terminals went smoke free by July. Antonio Cipollone in the
United States successfully sued 3 tobacco companies following his wife’s death from
lung cancer, as the tobacco companies have known for many years that there was a link
between cigarette smoking and cancer.
1994 Billboard advertising of tobacco products is made illegal under the Tobacco Control
Act 1990.
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Figures
Figure 1: Layers of Legitimacy Theory
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Figure 2: Transcription of Employee Related Disclosure in 1958 Annual Report
Staff: Being a new Company, a great deal of time has been devoted to training staff, and
everything possible has been done to provide model condition for all employees. The
enthusiastic team-work in every section of the organization has been outstanding and
warrants special mention.
Figure 3: Copy of page 22 of 1963 Annual Report
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Tables
Table 1: Critical Organisational Stakeholder
STAKEHOLDER

RESOURCES CONTROLLED
Contracts, grants, legislation, regulation, tax (Note that
The state
the last three of these could be either a ‘negative’ or
‘positive’ depending on the implementation)
Patronage (as customer), support (as community
The public
interest), labour
The financial community Investment
Few ‘direct resources’ however can substantially
The media
influence the decisions of two (if not three) previous
groups
Table 2: All Disclosure and Articles - Correlations for Rothmans (1956 – 1999)

SPEARMAN' S RHO

Disclosure
Disclosure
(All Social and
Environmental
Disclosure in
Annual Report)
I-Profit
(Accounting
Profit Indexed by
CPI)

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

%articles
(percentage of
articles relating to
Tobacco)

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

I-Profit

%articles

1.000
.

N

44

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

N

.019

1.000

.900

.

44

44

-.399(**)

.530(**)

.007

.000

.

44

44

44

1.000

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 3: Specific Social Disclosures and Health Related Articles Correlations for
Rothmans (1963 – 1999)

SPEARMAN' S RHO

SocDisc
SocDisc
(Social (less
Employee
Related)
Disclosure)
Health Art
(percentage of
articles relating
to Health and
Tobacco)
I-Profit
(Accounting
Profit Indexed by
CPI)

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

Health Art

I-Profit

1.000
.

N

37

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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-.458(**)

1.000

.004

.

37

37

-.349(*)

.760(**)

1.000

.034

.000

.

37

37

37

Table 4: Specific Social Disclosure and Government Regulation Correlations for
Rothmans (1963 – 1999)
SocDisc

SPEARMAN' S RHO

SocDisc
(Social (less
Employee
Related)
Disclosure)
Health Art
(percentage of
articles relating
to Health and
Tobacco)
Restriction
(Dummy Variable
for each new
major regulation)

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

Health Art

Restriction

1.000
.

N

37

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

-.458(**)

N
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

1.000

.004

.

37

37

-.521(**)

.784(**)

1.000

.001

.000

.

37

37

37

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 5: Specific Social Disclosure and Government Excise Correlations for Rothmans
(1963 – 1999)

RHO

SPEARMAN' S

SocDisc
SocDisc
(Social (less
Employee Related)
Disclosure)

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

Excise
(as a Dummy
Variable)

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

N

Excise

1.000
.
37

N

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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-.550(**)

1.000

.000

.

37

37

Graphs
Graph 1: Number of Social and Environmental Sentences per Annual Report
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Graph 3: Disclosure, Health Articles and Government Regulation
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Graph 4: Words of Social Disclosure in British American Tobacco UK corporate
reports 1976 - 1997 (Source: Campbell et al., 2003, p. 569, figure 2)
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